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1 Introduction
Modeling economic situations featuring a large number of agents with non-atomic
games is especially convenient because the inability of players to affect societal vari-
ables provides significant technical ease. However, this advantageous feature may
result in the dismissal of the strategic behavior desired to be depicted. Although
admittedly extreme, the following example delivers a clear portrait of this point:
Consider a game where players’ choices have to be in {0, 1}, and their payoffs depend
only on the average choice. Because that a player’s action does not affect the average
choice and his own payoff, any player is indifferent between any of his choices, and
as a result any strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, the unique
plausible Nash equilibrium is one where each player chooses the highest integer, be-
cause this strategy is the unique Nash equilibrium of the finite, but arbitrarily large,
player version of the same game.
Another interesting example is provided in the framework of the mass action
interpretation of Nash equilibrium given in Nash (1950): A (finite) normal form game
is interpreted to consist of a finite number of positions (or islands), each characterized
by a finite action space and a payoff function on the joint action space. One, then,
imagines that the actual players in this game reside on one of those islands, players
on the same island have identical payoffs and are equally likely to be chosen to play
the game. Therefore, starting from the case where there is only one player on each
island, we formulate associated replicas by symmetrically multiplying players on each
island and assuming that each player on an island is equally likely to be selected.
Therefore, for any k ∈ N, the k–replica game is one in which there are k players on
each island who are equally likely to be selected to play the original game, and the
payoff function and the action set of every player on an island are identical. It is,
then, not difficult to see that for any k ∈ N, a strategy is a Nash equilibrium of the
k–replica game if and only if the vector consisting of the average choice across players
of a given island is a Nash equilibrium of the original game. However, this equivalence
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fails to hold in the limit case of a continuum of players in each island, each of whom
are selected according to the Lebesgue measure. Indeed, in this case, no player can
affect the average choice of the island they reside on, and thus, every strategy is a
Nash equilibrium.
Such failures of (lower hemi) continuity of the equilibrium correspondence in non-
atomic games are well documented in the literature. Indeed, as noted in Levine
and Pesendorfer (1995) “equilibria can be radically different in a model with a finite
number of agents than in a model with a continuum of agents”. We refer the reader
to Carmona and Podczeck (2011) and the references therein for more on this subject.
In this paper we propose a refinement of Nash equilibrium in non-atomic games
designed to alleviate that problem in a tractable way. In fact, our goal is to develop
an equilibrium concept for non-atomic games that intuitively has the same properties
of the limit points of equilibria of large finite games (the precise meaning of this will
be illustrated below) and, at the same time, its existence is generally guaranteed.
Furthermore, because the definition of the refined equilibrium concept involves only
non-atomic games, its analysis is relatively easier compared with that of limit points
of equilibria of large finite games.
This study presents and analyzes the concept of strategic equilibrium (henceforth
to be abbreviated by SE) for non-atomic games in which the payoff of each agent
depends on what he chooses and on the distribution of actions chosen by the other
players (henceforth referred to as the societal choice). For any non-atomic game and
ε > 0, we define an ε–perturbed game by requiring each player to imagine that he
alone has an ε impact on the societal choice. Then, the set of SE consists of limits
of Nash equilibrium distributions of ε–perturbed games when ε tends to 0. It needs
to be pointed out that in the ε–perturbed game, players are not rational as in Selten
(1975). This is because each player thinks that he alone has an ε impact on the
societal choice, and does not contemplate that others do the same consideration.
After proving the existence of SE distributions under standard assumptions (e.g.,
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Mas-Colell (1984)) we show that SE is a refinement of Nash equilibrium. Moreover,
using the representation results of Khan and Sun (1995), Carmona (2008) and Car-
mona and Podczeck (2009), it is established that this analysis can be extended to
strategy profiles whenever either one of the following holds: (1) the action space of
every player is finite; or (2) the set of possible types of players is countable; or (3)
the space of players is super-atomless.
The impact of focusing on SE is well illustrated in the two example above: In the
game where players choose either 0 or 1, there is only one SE which consists of almost
all players choosing 1. Hence, the distribution of actions induced by the SE coincides
with the distribution induced by the unique Nash equilibrium of the same game when
played by a finite number of players. A similar strong conclusion holds in the Nash’s
mass action game as well. We prove that a strategy profile in the non-atomic version
is a SE if and only if the vector of the average across players on the same island is a
Nash equilibrium of the original normal form game.
Hence, in these examples, the notion of SE meets our desiderata of always existing
and reproducing the (limit) properties of equilibria of the same game played by a large
finite number of players.
Similar conclusions are reached in other applications we consider. We display
that the notion of SE provides a sharp refinement on non-atomic games of voting with
finitely many political parties (or candidates). Even though in these games any voting
profile is a Nash equilibrium, we prove that that the concept of SE eliminates almost
all implausible Nash equilibria: When players’ payoff functions depend continuously
on the distribution of seats parties get, the set of SE consists of strategy profiles
under which almost every agent votes for his most favored political party. Moreover,
abstention (by a strictly positive measure of players) is not observed in any of the
SE.
The second application we provide is a symmetric Cournot oligopoly (i.e., all cost
functions are alike). There we show that the set of strategic equilibria contains only
4
symmetric Nash equilibria, as it would happen when the set of players is finite. On
the other hand, Nash equilibria are characterized by any strategy that yields zero
profits. Technically, this example is of interest as it involves a uncountable actions
space and displays the non-linearities in an agent’s individual maximization problem
in the perturbed game.
In the third application, we demonstrate that in the optimal taxation game of
Levine and Pesendorfer (1995) the use of SE, instead of Nash equilibrium, makes
sure that the first-best can be obtained even with non-atomic players. Indeed, using
the concept of Nash equilibrium in non-atomic optimal taxation games, e.g. Chari
and Kehoe (1989), the government cannot detect (thus, punish) individual deviations
because one single agent cannot affect the societal choice, a phenomenon labeled as
the “disappearance of information” by Levine and Pesendorfer (1995). Even though,
the first-best is uniquely obtained in Nash equilibrium in finite player versions of the
same game, it is well known that the second-best, the Ramsey Equilibrium, is the
best possible with the use of Nash in non-atomic formulations. This, in turn, gives
rise to discussions about whether or not the government may commit in order to
achieve this particular payoff. Besides delivering a sharper conclusion that is not in
“paradoxical” terms with that from finite player cases, this game is also of interest
as it involves the use of SE in a sequential strategic interaction.
It should be emphasized that our analysis is related to, but differs from that of
Green (1980), Sabourian (1990), Levine and Pesendorfer (1995), and Carmona and
Podczeck (2011) who try to justify the set of Nash equilibria of non-atomic games as
limits of equilibria of large finite games with either noisy observations about deviating
players or employing the ε–equilibrium concept. That is, we are not asking “when
agents are negligible in large finite games”, but rather analyzing equilibria of non-
atomic games that are limits of equilibria of games where each player thinks that he
alone is not negligible.
We have chosen to present the formal definitions in the context of applications in
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Section 2 to ease the exposition. Section 3 describes the general framework of non-
atomic games, and in Section 4 we define the concept of SE and prove that it exists
and is a refinement of Nash equilibrium. Finally, Section 5 presents our non-atomic
version of Nash’s mass action game.
2 Applications
In this section, we present three sets of examples in which the concept of SE elim-
inates implausible Nash equilibrium outcomes that arise in non-atomic games. The
first example concerns voting games, the second Cournot competition, and the third
optimal taxation.
2.1 Proportional Voting
We present a non-atomic game of proportional voting in which each player has a
preference ordering on the set of political parties represented by a cardinal utility
function. Moreover, the payoff a player obtains is the weighted average of his utilities
on parties with the weights equal the fractions of seats parties obtain.
First we show that any strategy profile is Nash. In particular, not voting at all
and every fan of an extreme right (left) political party choosing an extreme left (right,
respectively) political party are among Nash equilibria.
The concept of SE provides a sharp refinement: Under the assumption that there
are at least two or more parties who are most favored for a strictly positive measure
of agents, we prove that the unique SE is one where each player votes for his favorite
political party.
The set of agents is given by [0, 1], which is endowed with the Lebesgue measure λ,
and the set of political parties by M = {1, . . . , m¯}. The action set of player t ∈ [0, 1]
is given by A =M ∪ {0} where choosing 0 denotes not voting.
The seats in the parliament that a party receives after an election depends on the
fraction of the population voting for it. Let µ = (µ0, µ1, . . . , µm¯) be a probability
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distribution on A with µ0 representing the fraction of people that has abstained and
µm denoting the fraction of people who has voted for party m ∈ M . Given such a
distribution, each party receives a portion of the parliament equal to the fraction of
votes it receives. Since only a fraction of 1 − µ0 of the people has voted, then party
m ∈ M receives a fraction µm/(1− µ0) of the parliament. Clearly, this formula only
makes sense if µ0 < 1. If µ0 = 1, an alternative definition must be given and we
assume that each party is assigned an equal share of the parliament. Since µ is a
probability distribution, then µa ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A and
∑
a∈A µa = 1. Let M(A)
denote the space of all probability distributions on A; also, let M(M) denote the
space of all probability distributions on M . The above rule governing how to split
the parliament across parties defines the following function pi :M(A)→M(M):
pi(µ) =

(
µ1
1−µ0 , . . . ,
µm¯
1−µ0
)
if µ0 < 1,(
1
m¯
, . . . , 1
m¯
)
otherwise,
(1)
for all µ ∈M(A).
Naturally, we are interested in voting distributions arising from players’ choices.
A strategy is a measurable function x : [0, 1]→ A, assigning an action to each player.
Then, a strategy x induces a distribution on A which will be used to measure the set of
players playing each action. Indeed, percentage of abstention is equal to λ({t ∈ [0, 1] :
x(t) = 0}) = λ(x−1(0)) (denoted by λ◦x−1(0)); and the percentage of the population
who voted for party m ∈ M is equal to λ({t ∈ [0, 1] : x(t) = m}) = λ(x−1(m))
(similarly, denoted by λ◦x−1(m)). It should be pointed out that since x is measurable,
then for all a in A we have that x−1(a) = {t ∈ [0, 1] : x(t) = a} is measurable. Hence,
λ ◦ x−1 = (λ ◦ x−10 , . . . , λ ◦ x−1m¯ ) ∈ M(A). That is, the distribution on A induced by
x is simply the Lebesgue measure of the inverse image of x. Therefore, (1) delivers
the distribution of the seats in the parliament induced by x. That is, we will restrict
attention to pi(λ◦x−1) ∈M(M). Finally, for notational purposes, let pix = pi(λ◦x−1);
and, for all a ∈ A, piax denotes the ath coordinate of pix.
Each player t ∈ [0, 1] is assumed to have a preference ordering onM , characterized
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by a (cardinal) utility function vt :M → R++, where vmt denotes the utility of player
t when the political party m obtains all the seats in the parliament. We say player t
strictly prefers m to m′ if and only if vmt > v
m′
t . For simplicity we restrict attention
to strict preferences, and thus, for all m,m′ ∈M , vmt 6= vm′t . Moreover, we let m?t be
the favorite political party of agent t, i.e. v
m?t
t > v
m
t for all m ∈ M . The return of
player t under strategy profile x then is
u(t,x) =
∑
m∈M
pimx v
m
t .
We can define a function, U , assigning each player to a utility function, i.e. U(t) = vt.
Then, U−1(vt) identifies the set of players who have the utility function vt, and we
say all players τ ∈ U−1(vt) are of the same type as player t, because vτ = vt for
all τ ∈ U−1(vt). In order to abstract from non-fruitful technicalities, we assume the
set of players’ types is finite. Therefore, we can partition [0, 1] into finite number of
subsets UJj=1, thus, attention is restricted only to a finite number of payoff functions.
Because that the Lebesgue measure assigns measure zero to any one of the players,
for any given x no single player can affect the distribution pix. Thus, it follows that
any strategy is a Nash equilibrium. In particular, the strategy defined by x(t) = 0 for
all t ∈ [0, 1] is a Nash equilibrium in which abstention is a society wide phenomenon.
In order to overcome this unpleasant feature, we propose the concept of SE. Given
any non-atomic game and ε > 0, we define the ε–perturbed game, in which each
player believes that he alone has an ε impact on the distribution of actions resulting
from a strategy (alternatively, each player believes that he alone is an atom with ε
mass). Then, a strategy x is a SE if there exists a sequence {εk,xk}∞k=1 with εk ↘ 0
and xk a Nash equilibrium of εk–perturbed game, and λ ◦ (U,xk)−1 converges to
λ ◦ (U,x)−1. Convergence of λ ◦ (U,xk)−1 to λ ◦ (U,x)−1 means that λ({t : U(t) =
vj and xk(t) = m}) converges to λ({t : U(t) = vj and x(t) = m}) for all j = 1, . . . , J
and m = 0, . . . ,M .1
1This characterization of the convergence of λ ◦ (U,xk)−1 to λ ◦ (U,x)−1 holds only because both
the set of types and the set of action are finite. See Section 3 for the general definition.
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Given ε > 0, the ε–perturbed game is defined by modifying each player’s payoff
function. This is done by altering the distribution of actions that a strategy induces in
the following way: Player t thinks that his choice has an ε impact on the distribution,
which implies that he thinks that all the other players have an impact of only (1− ε)
in total. This, in turn, implies that if he votes (i.e., chooses m ∈M), then he believes
that the fraction of voters is at least ε. In fact, he believes that the abstention is only
(1 − ε)pi0x. If he does not vote, then the abstention is ε + (1 − ε)pi0x. Furthermore,
if he votes for party m, then he believes that the fraction of the population voting
for it is ε + (1 − ε)pimx , while the fraction of party m′ 6= m is (1 − ε)pim′x . Formally,
the above distribution can be obtained as follows: Let δt be probability measure on
[0, 1] that assigns probability one to t. Then, it is clear that player t is computing
the distribution induced by x using the measure λε,t = εδt + (1 − ε)λ. That is,
player t believes that the distribution on A is λε,t ◦ x−1 instead of λ ◦ x−1. Note that
λε,t ◦ x−1 = εδa+ (1− ε)λ ◦ x−1, where a = x(t) and δa is the probability measure on
A concentrated at a.
As a result of employing (1) with λε,t ◦x−1 we obtain a distribution pi(λε,t ◦x−1) in
M(M). We denote pi(λε,t ◦x−1) by pix,ε,a, where a = x(t). Thus, for all m ∈M , pimx,ε,a
denotes the fraction of total votes that party m gets when player t chooses a ∈ A in
the ε–perturbed game.
When player t chooses 0, the distribution on parties remains the same, i.e.
pix,ε,0 = pix. (2)
This is because, when pi0x < 1 and x(t) = 0, player t contemplates the fraction
of players (including himself) who do not vote to be given by 1 − (ε + (1 − ε)pi0x) =
(1−ε)(1−pi0x). Moreover, because x(t) = 0, player t thinks that the measure of players
voting to party m is (1− ε)pimx . On the other hand, when pi0x = 1, ε + (1− ε)pi0x = 1
showing that in the ε–perturbed game the measure of players not voting does not
change.
In the ε–perturbed game player t thinks that voting to party m would result in
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political parties obtain the following portions of the parliament:
pix,ε,m =
(
(1− ε)pi1x
1− (1− ε)pi0x
, . . . ,
(1− ε)pim−1x
1− (1− ε)pi0x
,
ε+ (1− ε)pimx
1− (1− ε)pi0x
,
(1− ε)pim+1x
1− (1− ε)pi0x
,
. . . ,
(1− ε)pim¯x
1− (1− ε)pi0x
)
(3)
When player t’s choice is m, for m′ 6= m, we can write pim′x,ε,m = [(1− ε)pim′x ]/[1− pi0x+
εpi0x], thus, pi
m′
x,ε,m < pi
m′
x if and only if pi
m′
x > 0; and, furthermore, pi
m′
x,ε,m = pi
m′
x = 0
if pim
′
x = 0. Similarly, pi
m
x,ε,m > pi
m
x if and only if pi
m
x + pi
0
x < 1 or pi
0
x = 1. Moreover,
pimx,ε,m = pi
m
x = 1 if pi
m
x + pi
0
x = 1 and pi
0
x < 1.
Player t’s payoff is defined using the same expression as before, but with pi(λε,t ◦
x−1) instead of pix: The payoff of player t choosing a ∈ A in the ε–perturbed game
for a given strategy x is
uaε(t,x) =
∑
m∈M
pimx,ε,av
m
t .
For all ε > 0 and all strategies x, by voting to his most favorite party m?t instead
of choosing m, m 6= m?t , player t would strictly increase his expected utility, unless
pi0x < 1 and pi
m?t
x + pi0x = 1. This is because, for all ε, x and mˆ 6= m?t ,
um
?
t
ε (t,x)− umˆε (t,x) =
ε+ (1− ε)pim?tx
1− (1− ε)pi0x
v
m?t
t +
∑
m′ 6=m?t
(1− ε)pim′x
1− (1− ε)pi0x
vm
′
t
−ε+ (1− ε)pi
mˆ
x
1− (1− ε)pi0x
vmˆt −
∑
m′ 6=mˆ
(1− ε)pim′x
1− (1− ε)pi0x
vm
′
t
=
ε
1− (1− ε)pi0x
(v
m?t
t − vmˆt ) > 0.
Furthermore, player t would also increase his utility by voting to m?t instead of not
voting provided that pi0x + pi
m?t
x < 1 or pi0x = 1. This is because in the first case for
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every ε, x satisfying either of these conditions, u
m?t
ε (t,x)− u0ε(t,x) is given by∑
m∈M
(
pimx,ε,m?t − pimx,ε,0
)
vmt =
ε
1− (1− ε)pi0x
v
m?t
t
−
∑
m∈M
(
1
1− pi0x
− 1− ε
1− (1− ε)pi0x
)
pimx v
m
t
=
ε
1− (1− ε)pi0x
v
m?t
t
−
∑
m∈M
(
ε
(1− pi0x)(1− (1− ε)pi0x)
)
pimx v
m
t
=
(
ε
1− (1− ε)pi0x
)(
v
m?t
t −
∑
m∈M
(
pimx
1− pi0x
)
vmt
)
> 0,
because v
m?t
t > v
m
t for all m 6= m?t ; The second case, i.e. when pi0x = 1, (um
?
t
ε (t,x) −
u0ε(t,x)) equals v
m?t
t − 1m¯
∑
m∈M v
m
t , clearly strictly positive. Finally, when pi
0
x < 1
and pi
m?t
x + pi0x = 1, then party m
?
t already has all the seats at the parliament, and so
player t is indifferent between voting for m?t and not voting.
Thus, we have two cases: The first and interesting case happens when there is no
m ∈ M such that λ({t ∈ [0, 1] : vmt > vm′t for all m′ ∈ M}) = 1. In this case, x is a
SE if and only if x(t) = m?t for almost all t, establishing that the unique SE profile is
where almost every player t votes only for his favorite political party.
The second case happens when there exists m ∈ M such that λ({t ∈ [0, 1] :
vmt > v
m′
t for all m
′ ∈ M}) = 1. In this case, for all ε > 0, if x is an ε – strategic
equilibrium, then pimx = 1− pi0x and pi0x < 1. Hence, x is a SE if and only if
pimx = 1− pi0x.
The assumption that no agent can be indifferent between two political parties is
just to simplify the argument. If we were to allow indifference relations on the set
of political parties by some (possibly all of the) players, the result would essentially
be the same (provided that there are no two or more parties each of which is strictly
preferred to all the others by almost every agent): The set of strategic equilibria will
be strategy profiles in which every agent t would not vote for any of the political
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parties m ∈ M \M(t), where M(t) = {m˜ ∈ M : vt(m˜) ≥ vt(m),∀m ∈ M}. That is,
in any strategic equilibrium agents choose one of their favorite political parties.
A slightly modified version of this game can be used in the analysis of allocating
public resources on projects: A fixed amount of perfectly divisible public resources
B ∈ R++, is to be allocated on M projects, all of which do not require any capital
investments. Each player t ∈ [0, 1] chooses an action in A =M∪{0}, where 0 denotes
not voting. Given x, m gets pimx of B as defined above, and player t’s utility function
is u(t,x) =
∑
m∈M(Bpi
m
x )v
m
t . Due to the above, unless all players strictly prefer the
same project, the unique SE is one where almost all players choose their favorite
project despite the fact that all strategy profiles are Nash equilibria.
2.2 Cournot Oligopoly
In this section we formulate and analyze a symmetric Cournot oligopoly with a con-
tinuum of players, and demonstrate that SE rules out all the non-symmetric Nash
equilibria.
The set of agents is given by [0, 1], endowed with the Lebesgue measure; and each
of them can choose a quantity x(t) ∈ [0, q¯], where q¯ > 1. The symmetric unit cost of
production for each t ∈ [0, 1] is 1. Given the quantity choices x the inverse demand
is given by p = 2− ∫ xdλ.
The profit function of firm t is
Π (t,x) =
(
1−
∫
x
)
x(t).
Let U(t) = Π(t, ·) for all t ∈ [0, 1] be the function assigning payoff functions to all
players in the game.
The set of Nash equilibria in this game is any strategy profile x satisfying
∫
xdλ =
1. The reason is that as long as
∫
xdλ = 1, then p = 1, thus, any player would be
indifferent between any of their choices, since each player is atomless.
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Given a profile x and ε > 0, the profit of t in the ε–perturbed game is
Πε (t,x) =
(
1− (1− ε)
∫
x− εx(t)
)
x(t).
Thus, the best response of t is
xε(t) =
1− (1− ε) ∫ x
2ε
.
In equilibrium, ∫
xε =
∫ (
1− (1− ε) ∫ xε
2ε
)
=
1− (1− ε) ∫ xε
2ε
.
Thus,
∫
xε =
1
1+ε
which gives us (by substituting back to the best response function)
xε(t) =
1
1 + ε
.
Letting x?(t) = 1 for every player t ∈ [0, 1], it follows easily that λ◦(U,xε)−1 converges
to λ ◦ (U,x?)−1. Conversely, if τ = limε λ ◦ (U,xε)−1, then τ({(Π, 1)}) = 1 and so for
all SE x, we have x(t) = x?(t) for almost every t. Hence, the set of strategic equilibria
consists of strategies x such that x(t) = 1 for almost every t ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, unlike for
Nash equilibrium, there is a unique SE (up to a measure zero set of players).
2.3 Optimal Taxation
The strategic interaction analyzed in this section concerns the optimal taxation game,
example 3, of Levine and Pesendorfer (1995). We will show that the use of SE, instead
of Nash equilibrium, will make sure that the first-best can be obtained even with a
continuum of non-atomic players. Moreover, this game is of additional interest as it
involves the use of SE in conjunction with sequential rationality.
The strategic interaction between the government, the large player L, and large
number of identical small players, where a representative individual is denoted by S,
takes place over three periods, 0, 1, and 2. The government who can precommit in
the initial period to a reaction (to the choices of the households) in the final period,
13
must choose whether to place a tax on capital or use a distortionary tax in order to
raise adequate revenue. Households must choose an action after the precommitment,
but before the actual move of the large player.
The set of households S = [0, 1] and is endowed with the Lebesgue measure λ.
Each household is endowed with 1 unit of capital which can be invested, 0 ≤ xS ≤ 1 to
deliver (1+ r)xS, r > 0. We denote the set of actions of any one of the households by
AS = [0, 1]. The households care about the total amount of capital at the end of the
game. The government has to collect some amount of resources which is strictly higher
than 1+r. In order to raise that amount of resources, the government may use one of
the following two tax schemes. The first tax scheme consists of a non-distortionary tax
on the investments (collecting all the investments plus its interests). In this situation
the tax collected does not suffice to cover the needed resources of the government.
Hence, the government incurs a loss due to the revenue shortfall in the amount of
p(1−xS). The utility of household S would then be given by (1−xS), the amount of
capital net of the investment. The government’s utility is the utility of the household
S minus the penalty resulting from the revenue shortfall: (1−xS)(1−p). The second
tax scheme consists of a distortionary tax on some other resource in the economy (say,
labor), which will cover the amount of needed resources for the government. Because
that it is distortionary, each household incurs a cost of c > 1 + r. The utility of the
household at the end of the game consists of their endowment net of investment, i.e.
(1 − xS), plus the proceeds from their investment, i.e. (1 + r)xS, and finally minus
the cost from the use of a distortionary tax, c. Hence, is equal to (1 + rxS − c). As
there are no revenue shortfalls, the government obtains a utility, equal to that of the
households, i.e. (1 + rxS − c).
The government implements the non-distortionary tax with a probability of xL.
The set of actions of the government is denoted by AL = [0, 1].
The government’s payoff function, uL : AS × AL → R, is defined by
uL(xL, xS) = (1− xL)(1 + rxS − c) + xL(1− xS)(1− p)
14
where c > 1 + r and p > 1. Each household’s payoff function is uS : AS × AL → R
uS(xL, xS) = (1− xL)(1 + rxS − c) + xL(1− xS).
Define uS = minxL maxxS uS(xS, xL), denoting the payoff that S can guarantee for
himself. In his best response, S chooses xS = 1 if xL < r/(1 + r), anything in [0, 1] if
xL = r/(1 + r), and xS = 0 otherwise. Thus, the minmax is obtained when xL = 0
and xS = 1, and delivers uS = (1+r− c) < 0. Let, u∗L = maxxS ,xL uL(xS, xL), subject
to uS(xS, xL) ≥ uS. In this situation, xL = 1 and xS = 1 solves this problem, and
renders u∗L = 0; and, because that the utility of S would be 0, this arrangement is
also individually rational.
Going into the non-atomic case, it is worthwhile to point out that in this game
there is only one type of households. I.e. λ ◦ U−1(uS) = 1. Let xL : AS → AL be a
strategy of the government and xS : [0, 1] → AS a strategy for the households. Let,
for all a, α ∈ AS,
Ut,S (a,xL (α)) = (1− xL (α)) (1 + ra− c) + xL (α) (1− a).
Then, each household t’s payoff function is defined by Ut,S
(
xS(t),xL
(∫
xS
))
and the
government’s payoff function is defined by
UL
(
xL,
∫
xS
)
=
(
1− xL
(∫
xS
))(
1 + r
∫
xS − c
)
+xL
(∫
xS
)(
1−
∫
xS
)
(1− p),
where c > 1 + r and p > 1.
A pair (xS,xL) is a Stackelberg response if
Ut,S
(
xS(t),xL
(∫
xS
))
≥ Ut,S
(
a,xL
(∫
xS
))
for all a ∈ AS and almost all t ∈ [0, 1]. A pair (xS,xL) is a precommitment equilibrium
if it is a Stackelberg response and if
UL
(
xL,
∫
xS
)
≥ UL
(
x˜L,
∫
x˜S
)
(4)
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for all Stackelberg responses (x˜S, x˜L).
Note that Assumptions 1 – 3 of Levine and Pesendorfer (1995) are satisfied. Thus,
by Theorem 1 of Levine and Pesendorfer (1995), it is known that a precommitment
equilibrium exists, and the unique amount received by the government is strictly lower
than the first-best level 0. 2 In what follows, we show that there exists a strategic
precommitment equilibrium and the unique amount received by the large player is
U∗L = 0.
Let ε > 0. In words, in the ε–perturbed game a.e. player imagines that his
deviation would be affecting the societal choice, thus, deviations would be identifiable
by the government. Indeed, the government, in contrast to the non-atomic case, may
employ the following strategy: Chose of 1 whenever the societal choice in the ε–
perturbed game is 1; otherwise, the government “punishes” the small players by
choosing 0. This, in turn, will make sure that the first-best can be obtained in
equilibrium in the ε–perturbed game, ε > 0. And, it is the unique SE payoff because
the government chooses first and the best responses of the households in the any
ε–perturbed game is uniquely determined. This, then, clearly implies that the limit
as ε tends to 0 (i.e. the strategic precommitment equilibrium) is one in which the
unique SE amount received by the government is the first-best. These are formally
presented below.
A pair (xS,xL) is an ε– Stackelberg response if
Ut,S
(
xS(t),xL
(∫
xS
))
≥ Ut,S
(
a,xL
(
εa+ (1− ε)
∫
xS
))
for all a ∈ AS and a.e. t ∈ [0, 1]. A pair (xS,xL) is an ε–precommitment equilibrium
if it is an ε–Stackelberg response and if condition (4) holds for all ε–Stackelberg
responses (x˜S, x˜L). Finally, a pair (xS, xL) is a strategic precommitment equilibrium
distribution if there exists {εk}∞k=1 such that εk → 0, (xkS,xkL) is an εk–precommitment
equilibrium for all k ∈ N, λ ◦ (U,xkS)−1 converges to λ ◦ (U,xS)−1 and xkL converges
2Clearly, the first best strategies cannot be Stackelberg responses. This is because, when xL(1) =
1, due to
∫
xS \t x′t,S =
∫
xS , x′t,S ∈ AS , a.e. t’s best response is x′t,S = 0, and not xS(t) = 1.
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uniformly to xL.
Claim 1 There exists a strategic precommitment equilibrium and the unique payoff
received by the government is 0 (the first-best).
Proof. Consider x∗L defined by
x∗L(z) =
 1 if z = 1,0 if z < 1
and x∗S defined by x
∗
S(t) = 1 for all t ∈ [0, 1]. For all ε > 0, εa + (1 − ε)
∫
x∗S = 1 if
and only if a = 1. Thus,
Ut,S
(
a,x∗L
(
εa+ (1− ε)
∫
x∗S
))
=
 0 if a = 1,1 + ra− c if a < 1.
Because that 1 + ra − c < 0 for all a ≤ 1, we have that (x∗S,x∗L) is a ε-Stackelberg
response for all ε > 0. Since UL
(
x∗L,
∫
x∗S
)
= 0 ≥ UL
(
xL,
∫
xS
)
for all (xL,xS), it
follows that (x∗S,x
∗
L) is a ε-precommitment equilibrium for all ε > 0. It is then clear
that (x∗S,x
∗
L) is a strategic precommitment equilibrium. This establishes existence of
a strategic precommitment equilibrium.
We next show the uniqueness of the strategic precommitment equilibrium payoff
for the government. Let (xS,xL) be a strategic precommitment equilibrium and
(xkL,x
k
S) be a sequence of εk-precommitment equilibria satisfying the above conditions.
Fix k ∈ N and note that if UL
(
xkL,
∫
xkS
)
< 0, then UL
(
xL,
∫
xS
)
< UL
(
x∗L,
∫
x∗S
)
and,
therefore, (xkS,x
k
L) is not an εk-precommitment equilibrium. Hence, UL
(
xkL,
∫
xkS
)
= 0
for all k ∈ N.
We have that
∫
xkS →
∫
xS since λ ◦
(
U,xkS
)−1
converges to λ ◦ (U,xS)−1. We also
have that xkL(
∫
xkS)→ xL(
∫
xS) since x
k
L converges uniformly to xL. Thus,
UL
(
xL,
∫
xS
)
=
(
1− xL
(∫
xS
))(
1 + r
∫
xS − c
)
+xL
(∫
xS
)(
1−
∫
xS
)
(1− p)
= lim
k
UL
(
xkL,
∫
xkX
)
= 0.
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3 Non-Atomic Games
In this section, we formally describe non-atomic games in which each player has a
compact set of actions and a continuous payoff function that depends only on his
choice and on the distribution of actions. The set of players is a probability space
(T,Σ, λ) such that {t} ∈ Σ for all t ∈ T . The set of actions is denoted by A,
and we assume that it is a non-empty, compact metric space. By a distribution of
actions we mean a Borel probability measure on A. Let M(A) be the space of Borel
probability measures on A endowed with the topology of the weak convergence of
probability measures. By Parthasarathy (1967, Theorem II.6.4), it follows thatM(A)
is a compact metric space. We write µn ⇒ µ whenever {µn}∞n=1 ⊆M(A) converges to
µ, which happens if
∫
A
hdµn converges to
∫
A
hdµ for all bounded, continuous functions
h : A→ R. Let ρ denote the Prohorov metric onM(A), which is known to metricize
the weak convergence topology.
In order to accommodate general examples, such as the Nash’s mass action game,
we allow players’ payoff functions to depend on the distribution of choices made by a
finite number of subgroups of players. Formally, each player’s payoff depends on his
choice a ∈ A and on a L – dimensional vector (τ1, . . . , τL), L ∈ N, of distributions
on A. Let L ∈ N and U denote the space of real-valued continuous payoff functions
defined on A × (M(A))L. The set U represents the space of players’ characteristics
or types. We endow it with the supremum norm, thus, making it a complete and
separable metric space.
A game with a continuum of players is defined by assigning a payoff function to
each player and defining a partition of the set of players into the relevant subgroups.
Thus, it is characterized by a measurable function U : T → U and a finite partition
{Ti}Li=1 of T such that Ti is measurable and λ(Ti) > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , L. Each set Ti
is interpreted as a group or an institution and is endowed with the following measure
λi = λ/λ(Ti). We represent such game by G = ({Ti}Li=1, U, A).
For convenience, let Ui : Ti → U , i = 1, . . . , L, denote the restriction of U to
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Ti. A strategy x = (x1, . . . ,xL) is a vector of measurable functions xi : Ti → A,
i = 1, . . . , L. A pair ((Ui)
L
i=1, (xi)
L
i=1) induces a vector of probability measures on
U × A denoted by (λ1 ◦ (U1,x1)−1, . . . , λL ◦ (UL,xL)−1) ∈ (M(U × A))L. The payoff
of player t ∈ Ti is
Ut(xi(t), λ1 ◦ x−11 , . . . , λL ◦ x−1L ).
Given a vector of Borel probability measures (τ1, . . . , τL) ∈ (M(U × A))L, we
denote by τi,U and τi,A the marginals of τi on U and A respectively. The expression
u(a, τ1,A, . . . , τL,A) ≥ u(A, τ1,A, . . . , τL,A) means u(a, τ1,A, . . . , τL,A) ≥ u(a′, τ1,A, . . . , τL,A)
for all a′ ∈ A.
Given a gameG = ({Ti, Ui}Li=1, A), a vector of Borel probability measures (τ1, . . . , τL) ∈
M(U × A)L is an equilibrium distribution for G if for all i = 1, . . . , L,
1. τi,U = λi ◦ U−1i , and
2. τi({(u, a) ∈ U × A : u(a, τ1,A, . . . , τL,A) ≥ u(A, τ1,A, . . . , τL,A)}) = 1.
We will use the following notation: Bτ = {(u, a) ∈ U × A : u(a, (τi,A)i) ≥
u(A, (τi,A)i)}. Note that Bτ is closed, and so a Borel set; hence τi(Bτ ) is well de-
fined. Also, if (u, a) belong to Bτ , then a maximizes the function a˜ 7→ u(a˜, (τi,A)i).
Thus, we implicitly assume that no player can affect the distribution of actions, and
in this sense the above describe a game with a continuum of players.
A strategy x = (x1, . . . ,xL) is a Nash equilibrium of G if Ut(x(t), λ1◦x−11 , . . . , λL◦
x−1L ) ≥ Ut(a, λ1 ◦x−11 , . . . , λL ◦x−1L ) for almost all t ∈ T and all a ∈ A. Nash equilibria
exist if either A or U(T ) (or both) are countable, or if (T,Σ, λ) is super-atomless (see,
respectively, Khan and Sun (1995), Carmona (2008) and Carmona and Podczeck
(2009)) but may fail to exist otherwise as shown by Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997).3
3Formally, (T,Σ, ϕ) is super-atomless if for every E ∈ Σ with ϕ(E) > 0, the subspace of L1(ϕ)
consisting of the elements of L1(ϕ) vanishing off E is non-separable. This notion was first introduced
by Podczeck (2008).
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4 Strategic equilibria
4.1 Strategic Equilibrium Distributions
As was stressed in the introduction, we wish to consider those Nash equilibria that
can be seen as a limit of equilibria in games in which each player imagines that he
alone has a small, yet positive, impact on the distribution of actions (societal choice)
of the group he belongs to. Clearly, the need for a modification arises because for
each player t, λi({t}) = 0.
Associating a player with such a weight on his group’s societal choice, is done with
the help of the following measures: For each 1 ≤ i ≤ L, ε > 0, and t ∈ Ti ⊆ T ; let
δt be the probability measure on T concentrated at t (i.e., δt({t}) = 1), and define
a measure λi,t,ε = εδt + (1 − ε)λi. Thus, under λi,t,ε player t alone is an atom in
group i with mass ε. In other words, in the game described by λi,t,ε, t believes that
he alone has an ε impact on the societal choice of group i. In fact, for all strategies
xi : Ti → A,
λi,t,ε ◦ x−1i = εδxi(t) + (1− ε)λi ◦ x−1i . (5)
In order to construct a game where each player imagines that he, but no other
player, has an ε impact on the distribution of the choices of the type he belongs to,
we define the ε – perturbed game by altering players’ payoff functions using the above
measures:
For all ε > 0, t ∈ Ti, a ∈ A and τ = (τj)Lj=1 ∈ (M(A))L, define
Ui,ε(t) (a, τ) = Ui(t) (a, (εδa + (1− ε)τi, τ−i)) .
We then define the ε – perturbed game Gε of G as Gε =
({Ti, Ui,ε}Li=1, A). Note that
the ε – perturbed game Gε has the same players, and actions spaces as the original
game G and that, for every strategy x,
Ui,ε(t)(x) = Ui(x(t), (εδx(t) + (1− ε)λi ◦ x−1i , (λj ◦ x−1j )j 6=i)).
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We say that a distribution τ ∗ = (τ ∗i )
L
i=1 ∈ M(U × A)L is a strategic equilibrium
distribution of G if there exists a sequence {εk}∞k=1 ⊆ (0, 1) decreasing to zero and a
sequence {τ ∗k}∞k=1 converging to τ ∗ such that τ ∗k is an equilibrium distribution of Gεk ,
for every k ∈ N.
Theorem 1 establishes the existence of SE distributions.
Theorem 1 Every game with a continuum of players has a SE distribution.
Proof. Let ε > 0 and 1 ≤ i ≤ L. Note first that Ui,ε : Ti → U is Borel measurable.
To see this define, for all a ∈ A and τ ∈ M(A)L, U (a,τ)i,ε by t 7→ Ui,ε(t)(a, τ) and
U
(a,τ)
i by t 7→ Ui(t)(a, τ). Since U (a,τ)i,ε = U (a,(εδa+(1−ε)τi,τ−i))i and U (a,(εδa+(1−ε)τi,τ−i))i is
measurable by Carmona (2009, Proposition 1), it follows that U
(a,τ)
i,ε . Then, it follows
again by Carmona (2009, Proposition 1) that Ui,ε is measurable.
Next, we show that Ui,ε(t) is continuous for all t ∈ Ti. In fact, if a ∈ A, τ ∈
M(A)L, {ak}∞k=1 ⊆ A and {τk}∞k=1 ⊆M(A)L are such that limk ak = a and limk τk =
τ then εδak + (1 − ε)τ ki ⇒ εδa + (1 − ε)τi and the continuity of Ui implies that
limk Ui,ε(t)(ak, τk) = limk Ui(ak, (εδak +(1− ε)τ ki , τ k−i)) = Ui(a, (εδa+(1− ε)τi, τ−i)) =
Ui,ε(t)(a, τ).
Since Ui,ε is measurable and Ui,ε(t) is continuous for all i ∈ {1, . . . , L} and t ∈ Ti,
it follows by (a straightforward generalization of) Theorem 1 in Mas-Colell (1984)
that Gε has an equilibrium distribution.
To finish the proof, we let τ ∗n be an equilibrium distribution ofG1/n. Since {Ui,1/n}n
converges uniformly to Ui, then it follows that λi ◦U−1i,1/n converges to λi ◦U−1i for all
i = 1, . . . , L.
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , L}, let Ki = {λi ◦ U−1i , λi ◦ U−1i,1 , λi ◦ U−1i,1/2, . . .} and Ci = {µ ∈
M(U × A) : µi,U ∈ Ki}. It follows by Hildenbrand (1974, Theorems 32 and 33) that
Ki is tight, and so again by Hildenbrand (1974, Theorems 34, and 35) implies that
Ci is tight. Since {τ ∗k} ⊆ C1 × · · · × CL, it follows by Hildenbrand (1974, Theorem
31) that it has a converging subsequence. Hence, its limit point is a SE distribution
of G.
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Next, we show that any SE distribution is an equilibrium distribution.
Theorem 2 Every SE distribution is an equilibrium distribution.
Proof. Let τ be a SE distribution, and let {εk} and {τk} be such that εk ∈ (0, 1),
limk εk = 0, τk converges to τ , and τk is an equilibrium distribution of Gεk , for all
k ∈ N.
Note that, for all k ∈ N, {(u, a) ∈ U × A : u(a, τA) ≥ u(A, τA)} is closed and
τk({(u, a) ∈ U × A : u(a, τ kA) ≥ u(A, τ kA)}) = 1. Hence, supp(τk) ⊆ {(u, a) ∈ U × A :
u(a, τ kA) ≥ u(A, τ kA)}.
We next show that supp(τ) ⊆ {(u, a) ∈ U × A : u(a, τ kA) ≥ u(A, τA)}, which
implies that τ is an equilibrium distribution as desired.
Let (u∗, a∗) ∈ supp(τ). By Carmona and Podczeck (2009, Lemma 12), there exists
a subsequence {τkm}m of {τk}k and, for each m ∈ N, (um, am) ∈ supp(τm) such that
limm(um, am) = (u
∗, a∗). Hence, for all m ∈ N and a′ ∈ A, um(am, τmA ) ≥ um(a′, τmA )
and so u∗(a∗, τA) ≥ u∗(a′, τA). Thus, (u∗, a∗) ∈ {(u, a) ∈ U ×A : u(a, τA) ≥ u(A, τA)}.
4.2 Strategic Equilibrium Strategies
We say that a strategy x = (xi)
L
i=1 is a SE strategy of G if there exists a sequence
{εk}∞k=1 ⊆ (0, 1) decreasing to zero and a sequence {xk}∞k=1 such that xk is a Nash
equilibrium of Gεk for every k ∈ N and λ ◦ (Uεk ,xk)−1 ⇒ λ ◦ (U,x)−1.
Proposition 1 Let G be a non-atomic game. Then the following conditions are
equivalent:
(a) x is a SE.
(b) there exists a sequence {εk}∞k=1 ⊆ (0, 1) decreasing to zero and a sequence
{xk}∞k=1 such that xk is a Nash equilibrium of Gεk for every k ∈ N and λ ◦
(U,xk)
−1 ⇒ λ ◦ (U,x)−1.
Furthermore, if either A is countable or U(T ) is countable or (T,Σ, λ) is super-
atomless, then both (a) and (b) are equivalent to
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(c) λ ◦ (U,x)−1 is a SE distribution.
Proof. The equivalence between (a) and (b) follows from the fact that λ ◦
(Uεk ,xk)
−1 ⇒ λ ◦ (U,x)−1 if and only if λ ◦ (U,xk)−1 ⇒ λ ◦ (U,x)−1. To see the
latter equivalence, suppose first that λ ◦ (U,xk)−1 ⇒ λ ◦ (U,x)−1.
Let ε > 0 and h : U × A → R be a bounded uniformly continuous real-valued
function. We will show that there exists K ∈ N such that | ∫U×A hdλ ◦ (Uεk ,xk)−1 −∫
U×A hdλ ◦ (U,x)−1| < ε for all k ≥ K.
Since h is bounded, there exists B > 0 such that ||h|| ≤ B. Let η > 0 be such
that η < ε/[2(1 + 2B)]. Since h is uniformly continuous, there exists δ > 0 such that
|h(u, a) − h(u′, a′)| < η for all u, u′ ∈ U and a, a′ ∈ A such that ||u − u′|| < δ and
d(a, a′) < δ. Since Uεk(t) converges uniformly to U(t), then the function fk : T → R
defined by fk(t) = ||Uεk(t) − U(t)|| for all k ∈ N and t ∈ T converges pointwise to
zero. Hence, by Ergorov’s Theorem, there exists a measurable F ⊆ T and K ′ ∈ N
such that λ(T \ F ) < η and |fk(t)| ≤ δ/2 for all t ∈ F and k ≥ K ′.
Since λ◦ (U,xk)−1 ⇒ λ◦ (U,x)−1, there exists K ∈ N such that K ≥ K ′ such that
| ∫U×A hdλ ◦ (U,xk)−1 − ∫U×A hdλ ◦ (U,x)−1| < ε/2 for all k ≥ K.
Hence, for all k ≥ K,∣∣∣∣∫U×A hdλ ◦ (Uεk ,xk)−1 −
∫
U×A
hdλ ◦ (U,x)−1
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∫U×A hdλ ◦ (Uεk ,xk)−1 −
∫
U×A
hdλ ◦ (U,xk)−1
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∫U×A hdλ ◦ (U,xk)−1 −
∫
U×A
hdλ ◦ (U,x)−1
∣∣∣∣
<
∫
T
|h(Uεk(t),xk(t))− h(U(t),xk(t))|dλ(t) +
ε
2
=
∫
T\F
|h(Uεk(t),xk(t))− h(U(t),xk(t))|dλ(t)
+
∫
F
|h(Uεk(t),xk(t))− h(U(t),xk(t))|dλ(t) +
ε
2
< 2Bη + η +
ε
2
< ε.
Note that a similar argument to the above show that λ◦(Uεk ,xk)−1 ⇒ λ◦(U,x)−1
implies λ ◦ (U,xk)−1 ⇒ λ ◦ (U,x)−1.
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We finally turn to the proof of the equivalence between (a) and (c). Suppose that
x is a SE strategy of G. Let {εk}k and {xk}k be such that εk ↘ 0, xk is a Nash
equilibrium of Gεk and that λ ◦ (Uεk ,xk)−1 ⇒ λ ◦ (U,x)−1. Since λ ◦ (Uεk ,xk)−1 is an
equilibrium distribution of Gεk , then λ ◦ (U,x)−1 is a SE distribution of G.
Conversely, let τ = λ ◦ (U,x)−1 be a strategic equilibrium distribution. Let {εk}k
and {τk}k be such that εk ↘ 0, τk is an equilibrium distribution of Gεk and that
τk ⇒ τ . Then, since A is countable or U(T ) is countable or (T,Σ, λ) is super-
atomless, it follows by Khan and Sun (1995, Theorem 2), Carmona (2008, Theorem 1)
or Carmona and Podczeck (2009, Lemma 7) respectively that there exist xk such that
xk is a Nash equilibrium of Gεk and λ◦(Uεk ,xk)−1 = τk for all k. Since λ◦(Uεk ,xk)−1 =
τk ⇒ τ = λ ◦ (U,x)−1, it follows that x is a strategic equilibrium of G.
5 Mass-action Interpretation of Nash Equilibria
In his Ph.D. dissertation (see Nash (1950)), John Nash proposed two interpretations
of his equilibrium concept, with the objective of showing how equilibrium points “(...)
can be connected with observable phenomenon.” One interpretation is rationalistic:
if we assume that players are rational, know the full structure of the game, the game
is played just once, and there is just one Nash equilibrium, then players will play
according to that equilibrium.4
A second interpretation, that Nash referred to by the mass action interpretation,
is less demanding on players: “[i]t is unnecessary to assume that the participants
have full knowledge of the total structure of the game, or the ability and inclination
to go through any complex reasoning processes.” What is assumed is that there
is a population of participants for each position in the game, which will be played
throughout time by participants drawn at random from the different populations. If
there is a stable average frequency with which each pure strategy is employed by the
“average member” of the appropriate population, then this stable average frequency
4For a formal discussion of these ideas, see Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) and Kuhn (1996).
24
constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
Below we consider a continuum-of-player mass-action version of a normal-form
game and we present a new interpretation of Nash equilibrium: The (mixed) Nash
equilibria of the normal-form game are exactly the profiles of distributions over actions
induced by the strategic equilibria of its continuum-of-player mass-action version.
Consider a finite normal form game Γ = (N, (∆(Ai), vi)i∈N), whereN = {1, . . . , n}
is the set of positions, ∆(Ai) is the set of mixed strategies over the finite action set
Ai, and vi is the usual extension to mixed strategies of the payoff function. As in
Nash’s mass action interpretation, imagine that this game is played in a large society
divided into n groups, from each of which a participant is drawn at random.
For any k ∈ N, we define the k–replica game as follows: There are k players in
each position, and we assume that each player is matched with n− 1 players selected
from the other positions. This gives rise to the k–replica game, Gk, where the set of
players is Nk = {(i, j) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ k} and player (i, j) has ∆(Ai) as his action
space. Under the assumption that all matchings are equally likely, the probability
that an action a ∈ A = A1 × · · · × An is played when players are using a strategy
σ = (σi,j)i∈N,j=1,...,k is
n∏
i=1
k∑
j=1
σi,j(ai)
k
.
Let σ¯ = (σ¯1, . . . , σ¯n) ∈ ∆(A1) × · · · × ∆(An) be defined by σ¯i(ai) =
∑k
j=1 σi,j(ai)/k
and let the payoff of a player in position i be defined by
vki (σ) =
∑
a∈A
(∏
i′∈N
σ¯i′(ai′)
)
vi(a).
It is then easy to see (after going over the proof of Theorem 3) that for any k ∈ N,
σ is a Nash equilibrium of Gk if and only if σ¯ is a Nash equilibrium of Γ. In words,
Nash equilibria of Gk are precisely those strategies under which the average behavior
in all positions is part of the same Nash equilibrium of the original game Γ. I.e., on
average, every position is best-replying to the others.
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Even though this equivalence holds for every k ∈ N, it fails to do so in the limit
case of a continuum of players: let Ti = [0, 1] for all i ∈ N ; a player t ∈ Ti chooses an
element of Ai. Let x = (x1, . . . ,xn) be a strategy. A player is selected from each Ti
according to the Lebesgue measure, and thus, the probability that the player selected
from the ith group will play action ai ∈ Ai is λi◦x−1i (ai). We thus define x¯i = λi◦x−1i
and
Ui(t)(ai, λ1 ◦ x−11 , . . . , λn ◦ x−1n ) = vi(x¯1, . . . , x¯n) =
∑
a∈A
(∏
i′∈N
x¯i′(ai′)
)
vi(a).
5
We denote by G the game (Ti, Ai, Ui)i∈N .
It is easy to see that every strategy is a Nash equilibrium of G, because no t ∈ Ti
can affect x¯i, i = 1, . . . , n. On the other hand, the following Theorem shows that SE
of G are characterized by the property that, on average every position is best-replying
to the others. Hence, the distribution of actions induced by SE of G correspond to
the limit points of the corresponding distributions of Nash equilibria of Gk when k
converges to infinity.
Theorem 3 A strategy profile x∗ = (x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
n) is a SE of G if and only if (x¯
∗
1, . . . , x¯
∗
n)
is a Nash equilibrium of Γ.
Proof. (Sufficiency) Let (x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
n) be a strategy in G, and assume that x¯
∗ =
(x¯∗1, . . . , x¯
∗
n) is a Nash equilibrium of Γ. Let i ∈ N . We have that vi(x¯∗) ≥ vi(σi, x¯∗−i)
for all σi ∈ ∆(Ai). This implies, in particular, that vi(x¯∗) ≥ vi(εx(t)+ (1− ε)x¯∗i , x¯∗−i)
for all t ∈ Ti, and ε > 0. Hence, (x∗1, . . . ,x∗n) is a Nash equilibrium of Gε for all ε > 0,
thus, a SE of G.
(Necessity) Let (x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
n) be a SE of G, and let x¯
∗ = (x¯∗1, . . . , x¯
∗
n). We show
that for all i ∈ N , and ai ∈ Ai if x¯∗i (ai) > 0, then ai maximizes aˆi 7→ vi(aˆi, x¯∗−i) in Ai,
which then implies that x¯∗ is a Nash equilibrium of Γ. Let i ∈ N and ai ∈ Ai. If ai
5The above notation is appropriate in the following sense: represent Ai by the unit vectors
{ei1, . . . , ei|Ai|} in R|A| and define xˆi(t) = eij if and only if xi(t) = aj ∈ Ai. Then, λi◦x−1 =
∫
Ti
xˆidλi.
Hence, λi ◦ x−1 can, in fact, be understood as an average.
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does not maximize aˆi 7→ vi(aˆi, x¯∗−i) in Ai, then ai does not maximize aˆi 7→ vi(aˆi, x¯ε−i)
in Ai for all ε > 0 sufficiently small, where x¯
ε := (λ1 ◦ (xε1)−1, . . . , λ ◦ (xεn)−1), and
(xε1, . . . ,x
ε
n) is a Nash equilibrium of Gε, x
ε
i converges in distribution to x
∗
i for all
i ∈ N and ε→ 0. Since
Ui,ε(t)(aˆi, x¯
ε) = εvi(aˆi, x¯
ε
−i) + (1− ε)vi(x¯ε)
and xε is a Nash equilibrium of Gε, then x
ε
i (t) 6= ai a.e. t ∈ Ti and so x¯εi (ai) = 0.
Thus, x¯∗i (ai) = 0 since x
ε
i converges in distribution to x
∗
i .
Theorem 3 provides a new interpretation of Nash equilibria: they constitute pre-
cisely the vector of distributions of actions, one for each position, that are induced
by a (pure strategy) SE. Similarly as in Nash’s mass action interpretation, a Nash
equilibrium can be understood as a “stable” average behavior in a large society. How-
ever, since every SE is a Nash equilibrium, our interpretation is rationalistic and so
different from Nash’s. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that for our interpretation
one needs to regard full rationality as a limit case of incomplete rationality as in
Selten (1975).
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